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Comment

Awakening a Slumbering Giant:
Georgia's Judicial Selection System After
White and Weaver*

The fact that many of us may never live to see the completed work
should not appeal to us as a reason for hesitating. This work must
have its beginning. If those of us of this generation fail in the
initiative, the work is merely passed on to the next generation, and we
only bequeath to those that succeed us the-ills that we have inherited,
and leave to them nothing to merit respect or gratitude.'
I.

INTRODUCTION

Judicial selection, no matter its format, is an inherently political
process. In the broadest analysis, judges are selected either directly by
a popular election or indirectly by an executive branch appointment.
* I would like to thank Professors Jack L. Sammons and Patrick E. Longan of the
Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer University, for their gracious direction and
support.
1. Robert H. Hall, The FactsAbout Georgia Courts and Judges Today, 2 GA. STATE B.J.
389, 397 (1966) (quoting Justice Andrew J. Cobb, Report of Comm. on Jurisprudence,Law
Ref and Procedure,in TWENTY-SEVENTH ANNUAL SESSION 72, 86 (Georgia Bar Association

ed. 1910)).
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The President of the United States appoints federal judges with the
advice and consent of the Senate.' In keeping with the states' role as
the laboratories of democracy, judicial selection varies widely from state
to state. In Georgia, judges are elected in nonpartisan elections along
with the general primaries in even-numbered years.' In particular, the
Georgia Constitution grants the governor the power to appoint a judge
when a judgeship becomes vacant.4 Appointed judges stand for reelection with an incumbency advantage. For many judges, appointment
is the first path to the bench.
Since 1971, Georgia's governors have followed the example of Jimmy
Carter 5 and used a Judicial Nominating Commission ("JNC") in tandem
with their absolute appointment power. When a vacancy occurs, the
JNC takes nominations, screens candidates, and gives the governor a list
of recommended candidates. However, the governor is not obligated to
appoint from the JNC's choices.6 The structure of Georgia's JNC also
makes the appointment process vulnerable to the appearance of
judgeships for sale.
Judicial selection is a hot button issue nationwide. In 2002 the United
States Supreme Court decided Republican Party of Minnesota v.White,'
and national attention focused on the American Bar Association ("ABA")
Model Code of Judicial Conduct.8 In White the Court held that the
"Minnesota Supreme Court's canon of judicial conduct prohibiting
candidates for judicial election from announcing their views on disputed
legal and political issues violate[d] the First Amendment."9
Later that same year, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals decided
Weaver v. Bonner.1 ° The court declared parts of the Georgia Rules of
Judicial Conduct and Judicial Qualifications Commission Rules
unconstitutional, required the actual malice standard for restrictions on
judicial candidate speech, and allowed judicial candidates to personally

2. U.S. CONST. art. II,§ 2, cl.2.
3. O.C.G.A. § 21-2-138 (2003).
4. GA. CONST. art. VI, § 7, para. 3.
5. Ga. Exec. Order (Dec. 3, 1971), Jimmy Carter, Governor (unpublished executive
order, on file with the Secretary of State, Division of Archives and History, Reference
Services Section).
6. The JNC is not a constitutionally mandated body; rather, it is formed by executive
order. The current executive order states the JNC acts "in aid to the discretion reposed
in the Governor" and "shall recommend" qualified candidates. Ga. Exec. Order (June 11,
2003), Sonny Perdue, Governor (emphasis added), at http://www.gov.state.ga.us/ExOrders/
06_11_03_01.pdf.
7. 536 U.S. 765 (2002), remanded to 361 F.3d 1035 (8th Cir. 2004).
8. Id.
9. Id. at 788.
10. 309 F.3d 1312 (2002).
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Additionally, in dicta, the court equated
solicit campaign funds."
judicial elections with all other types of elections. 12 With these
heightened First Amendment protections for judicial campaign speech,
falling before
many scholars foresaw judicial independence and integrity
3
mudslinging and highly politicized judicial campaigns.'
In July 2003 the ABA published the Report of the Commission on the
21st Century Judiciary.'4 The ABA Report made recommendations for
preserving the judiciary's legitimacy and for improving judicial selection
in the face of the increased politicization of state courts. 15 In the
summer of 2003, the Court Futures Committee of the Georgia State Bar
discussed the larger question of what results an ideal judicial selection
process should produce.'" The statewide focus on judicial selection
continued in Georgia in 2004 with a symposium at the Walter F. George
School of Law at Mercer University in Macon' 7 and a Lamar Inn of
Court program in Atlanta.' 8
The balance of law and politics is always a delicate one. The recent
decisions of White and Weaver throw the tension between judicial
independence and judicial accountability into sharp relief. The judiciary,
as an institution, depends on public trust for the viability of the rule of
law it propounds. Nationwide, judicial selection reform efforts are
addressing campaign speech, campaign finance, voter education, and
judicial evaluation. The larger goals of judicial selection reform should
be reflected in Georgia's judicial selection processes.
This Comment will analyze the decisions in White and Weaver, discuss
the historical and current Georgia judicial selection system, and examine
the 2004 statewide appellate judicial elections in light of recent changes
to the judicial selection landscape. The Georgia Supreme Court
amended the Georgia Code of Judicial Conduct after the decisions in
White and Weaver. 9 In an attempt to preserve actual and apparent

11. Id. at 1321-24.
12. Id. at 1321.
13. See, e.g., COMMISSION ON THE 21ST CENTURY JUDICIARY, AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY ii (2003).
14. Id.
15. Id. at i-vii.
16. Symposium, Judicial Professionalism in a New Era of Judicial Selection, 56
MERCER L. REV. 807, 888 (2005).
17. Id. at 815.
18. The November 9, 2004 Lamar Inn of Court program was entitled "Election of
Judges." The web site for the Lamar Inn of Court may be found at www.innsofcourt.org/
inns/lamarinn/.
19. Order of the Supreme Court of Georgia, Jan. 7, 2004, available at http://www2.
7
state.ga.us/courts/supreme/j qc/_%20 _27_or.html.
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judicial integrity and maintain nonpartisan judicial elections, Georgia
has generated more private speech through the Georgia Committee for
Ethical Campaigns, proposed judicial campaign finance legislation, and
proposed State Bar judicial ethics reform. This Comment suggests that
Georgia should also consider creating a more patently independent
Judicial Nominating Commission to ensure that the goals of judicial
integrity are met.

II.
A.

THE FIRST AMENDMENT BACKDROP

Republican Party of Minnesota v. White

In a splintered 5-4 opinion, the United States Supreme Court held in
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White2 ° in June of 2002 that the
announce clause in Minnesota's Code of Judicial Conduct violated the
First Amendment.21 Five different justices wrote opinions.22
1. Factual Background. Minnesota elects its judges in nonpartisan races.23 Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(i) of the Minnesota Code of Judicial
Conduct stated that a judicial candidate shall not "announce his or her
views on disputed legal or political issues."24 Minnesota's "announce
clause" was modeled after the 1972 ABA Model Code of Judicial
In 1996 Gregory Wersal ran in the election for associate
Conduct.
justice on the Minnesota Supreme Court. His campaign literature
attacked prior decisions of the Minnesota Supreme Court on crime,
welfare, and abortion issues.26 The Lawyers Professional Responsibility

20. 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
21. Id. at 788.
22. Justice Scalia wrote for the majority and was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas. Justice O'Connor and Justice Kennedy each
wrote a separate concurrence. Justice Stevens's dissenting opinion was joined by Justices
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Likewise, Justice Ginsburg's dissenting opinion was joined
by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer. Id. at 766.
23. Id. at 768.
24. Id. (quoting MINN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(i) (2000)).
25. Before White, Minnesota did not adopt the 1990 ABA Model Code of Judicial
Conduct. The 1990 Code replaced the announce clause with language that prohibited
judicial candidates from committing or appearing to commit "with respect to cases,
controversies or issues that are likely to come before the court." MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(ii) (2000). The Court did not address whether the 1972 Model
Code of Judicial Conduct was the same as the 1990 Model Code of Judicial Conduct. White,
536 U.S. at 773 n.5.
26. Wersal's campaign literature variously stated: "[tihe Minnesota Supreme Court has
issued decisions which are marked by their disregard for the Legislature and a lack of
common sense;" "[sihould we conclude that because the Supreme Court does not trust
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Board ("Lawyers Board") issued advisory opinions, "investigate[d] and
27
prosecute[d] ethical violations of lawyer candidates for judicial office."
The Lawyers Board dismissed a complaint that alleged Wersal's
literature was improper. In the dismissal the Lawyers Board stated that
it doubted the announce clause could be constitutionally enforced.
Wersal withdrew from the 1996 election, but ran again in 1998 for the
same position. Wersal requested an advisory opinion on the planned
enforcement of the announce clause from the Lawyers Board. The
Lawyers Board did not respond to his enforcement question because
Wersal did not include a list of his proposed announcements. Nevertheless, the Lawyers Board reiterated its opinion that the constitutionality
of the announce clause was doubtful. Wersal filed a federal lawsuit,
argued that the announce clause violated the First Amendment, and
sought declaratory and injunctive relief. Wersal did not answer
questions during the campaign because he was wary of violating the
announce clause. On cross motions for summary judgment, the district
court found for the Lawyers Board. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed.2" The majority of the Supreme Court reversed and held that
the canon prohibiting judicial candidates "from announcing their views
on disputed legal issues violate[d] the First Amendment."29
2. The Majority Opinion. Justice Scalia framed the issue as
"whether the First Amendment permits the Minnesota Supreme Court
to prohibit candidates for judicial election in that State from announcing
their views on disputed legal and political issues."30 The text of the
announce clause states that a judicial candidate shall not "announce his
or her views on disputed legal or political issues. " 31 The scope of the
announce clause covers more than a promise to decide an issue one way.
It also covers a judicial candidate's statement of current position on an
issue. All the parties agreed that the announce clause was separate and
distinct from the "pledges or promises" clause.3 2 The Court specifically
restricted its opinion to the announce clause and did not address the
pledges or promises clause.33

police, it allows confessed criminals to go free;" "[i]t's the Legislature which should set our
spending policies [on welfare benefits];" and publicly funded abortions are "unprecedented"
and "pro-abortion." Id. at 771 (citations omitted).
27. Id. at 769.
28. Id. at 768-70.
29. Id. at 788.
30. Id. at 768.
31. Id. at 770 (quoting MINN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(i) (2000)).
32. Id.
33. Id.
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Justice Scalia also addressed extra-textual limits placed upon the
announce clause.34 A Judicial Board opinion allowed judicial candidates to criticize past decisions35 as long as the judicial candidate does
not also express an opinion against stare decisis.36 The district court
limited the announce clause's application to "disputed issues that are
likely to come before the candidate if he is elected judge."" The Eighth
Circuit accepted the district court's limitation and added another limit
on the announce clause. According to the Eighth Circuit, the announce
38
clause allows broad statements about caselaw and judicial philosophy
unless the statements are applied to specific issues.3 9 The announce
clause allowed a judicial candidate to discuss his character, education,
work habits, and approach to administrative duties. The Judicial Board
also kept40 a list of preapproved questions which a judicial candidate could
answer.

The announce clause restricted speech in two ways. First, the clause
was a content based prohibition. Second, the announce clause burdened
core speech about judicial candidates' qualifications for office. 41 The
Court applied the strict scrutiny test, so the Lawyers Board had "the
burden to prove that the announce clause is (1) narrowly tailored, to
serve (2) a compelling state interest."42 The announce clause is
narrowly tailored only if it "does not 'unnecessarily circumscrib[e]
protected expression.'" 43 The Lawyers Board argued for two compelling
state interests. They argued that the announce clause preserved both
the impartiality and the appearance of impartiality of the state judiciary
by protecting the due process rights of44litigants and upholding public
confidence in the judiciary, respectively.
Justice Scalia supplied three possible definitions for "impartiality"
after chastising the Lawyers Board for failing to supply a definition of
their compelling state interest. 45 The first definition of judicial

34. Id. at 771.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 772.
37. Id. at 771 (citing Republican Party of Minnesota v. Kelly, 63 F. Supp. 2d 967, 986
(D. Minn. 1999)).
38. Id. at 772.
39. Id. at 773.
40. Id. at 774. The preapproved questions covered cameras in the courtroom, caseload
reduction plans, judicial administration cost reduction plans, and proposals to treat
minorities and women fairly in the courts. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 774-75.
43. Id. at 775 (quoting Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 54 (1982)).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 775-79.
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impartiality is a judge without a "bias for or against a party to the
proceeding." 4' Here, judicial impartiality would ensure equal application of the law and is necessary for due process. Using this definition of
impartiality, the announce clause is not narrowly tailored because the
announce clause restricts speech on issues, not parties.47
The second definition of judicial impartiality is a judge with no
preconceptions on a legal view.48 This type of judicial impartiality
would give litigants an equal chance to convince a judge of their legal
views. 49 Applying this definition of impartiality, the announce clause
does not serve a compelling state interest because a "judge's lack of
predisposition regarding the relevant legal issues in a case has never
been thought a necessary component of equal justice."" Indeed, a
tabula rasa judge would be not only unusual but also unqualified.51
Moreover, the Minnesota Constitution only allows qualified judges.
Preserving the appearance of this type of impartiality is not a compelling
state interest either because "avoiding judicial preconceptions on legal
issues is neither possible nor desirable."
The third definition of judicial impartiality is an open-minded judge
who may be convinced on all views in a pending case even if those views
oppose his own preconceptions. 4 This type of judicial impartiality
would give litigants some chance to win on the legal issues.5 5 The
Court did not consider whether the application of this definition of
impartiality would preserve either of the advanced compelling state
interests because the Court did not "believe the Minnesota Supreme
Court adopted the announce clause for that purpose."5 6 In particular,
Minnesota encourages judges to "write, lecture, teach, speak and
participate in other extra-judicial activities concerning the law."57
Using impartiality as openmindedness cannot serve the interests of
impartiality. or the appearance of impartiality because Minnesota
encourages many other types of statements that might present a judge

46. Id. at 775.
47. Id. at 775-76.
48. Id. at 777.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 778. A tabularasajudge is a blank slate. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1491
(8th ed. 2004).
52. White, 536 US. at 778 (citing MINN. CONST. art. VI, § 5).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 779 (quoting MINN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 4(B) (2002)).
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with a chance to rule consistently with his prior statements.58 The
Court declared the announce clause "woefully underinclusive" because
the announce clause banned speech only at certain times and in certain
forms and "le[ft] appreciable damage to that supposedly vital interest
unprohibited."59
Moreover, the Court stated that an election is not an occasion that
allows an abridgement of First Amendment 60 protections. 6 Instead,
candidate qualification speech is "at the core of our electoral process and
of the First Amendment freedoms."6 2 The government cannot set the
campaign issues for the voters.63 The Court concluded that the purpose
The
of the announce clause was to undermine judicial elections. 6
Court insisted that "the difference between judicial and legislative
elections" has been "greatly exaggerate[d]."65 A state court judge
generates common law and forms the state constitution.66 The Court
stated that these powers explain the popularity of state judicial
elections.7
Finally, the Court rebutted the strong presumption that a "'universal
and long-established' tradition of prohibiting certain conduct" is
The majority of States conducted partisan judicial
constitutional."
elections by the Civil War. Restrictions on candidate speech did not
appear until 1923. The adoption of the announce clause or its 1990 ABA
successor has not been unanimous.69 While Minnesota's constitution
provides for popularly elected judges, its restrictions on judicial
candidate speech are the result of "judicial fiat."' ° The Court was
unsurprised by the tension in the system because Minnesota modeled its
Code after the ABA's Code, and the ABA "has long been an opponent of
judicial elections." 7'

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
222-23
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id.
Id. at 780.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
536 U.S. at 781.
Id. (quoting Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Comm., 489 U.S. 214,
(1989)).
Id. at 782.
Id.
Id. at 784.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 785 (quoting Republican Party v. Kelly, 247 F.3d 354,879-80 (8th Cir. 2001)).
Id. at 786.
Id. at 787.
Id.
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3. Justice O'Connor's Concurrence. Justice O'Connor wrote
separately to express her concern that judicial elections inherently
undermine the government's compelling interest in actual and perceived
judicial impartiality.72 She agreed that judges should be impartial, but
considered all judges subject to contested elections "are likely to feel that
they have at least some personal stake in the outcome of every
publicized case."7" Additionally, contested elections require large sums
of money to fund the campaigns. All but independently wealthy judges
74
will become indebted to special interest groups and big donors. In the
early twentieth century, the public viewed elected judges as "incompetent and corrupt."75 The Missouri Plan of a nonpartisan nominating
commission, judicial appointment by the governor, and unopposed
retention elections was the response to concerns of judicial impartiality.
Justice O'Connor stated that Minnesota must accept the "risks to judicial
bias" because it chose popular judicial election over merit selection and
retention elections.76
4. Justice Kennedy's Concurrence. Justice Kennedy wrote
separately to reiterate his view that "content-based speech restrictions
that do not fall within any traditional exception should be invalidated"
77
He agreed that
without even first applying the strict scrutiny test.
78
While
interests.
state
vital
are
integrity
actual and apparent judicial
"striv[ing] for judicial integrity is the work of a lifetime," Minnesota may
not usurp the right of the voters to determine the pertinence of judicial
candidate speech.79 Even if Minnesota is trying to prevent disrespect
for its judiciary in the midst of politicized campaigns, content-based
restrictions on political speech are not allowed by the First Amendment. o Instead, Justice Kennedy opined that more speech, particularly
from private actors like other lawyers, "the press, voluntary groups, ...
and interested citizens" would correct flawed judicial candidate

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 788 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
at 788-89 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
at 789-90 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
at 791 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
at 792 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
at 793 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
at 794 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
at 795 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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speech."1 Together, "[f~ree elections and free speech" can generate a
better understanding of and commitment to our rule of law. 2
5. Justice Stevens's Dissent. Justice Stevens wrote separately to
explain why the Court's reasoning troubled him even more than its
holding."8
First, Justice Stevens described the limits of the Court's
holding. 4 The Lawyers Board can still inform the electorate that a
judicial candidate's announcement shows his unfitness for the judiciary.
The Court has made the idea of judicial impartiality insensible because
the Court compounded judicial elections with legislative and executive
elections and conflated the statements in articles and judicial opinions
with campaigning statements. 5
Justice Stevens declared that the Court's reasoning "rests on two
seriously flawed premises": (1) the undervalued assessment of judicial
independence and impartiality and (2) the assumption that judicial
candidates should enjoy the same freedom of expression as other elected
politicians.8 6 Yet judges are fundamentally distinct from policymakers.
87
Policy is and should be decided by a majority vote in a democracy.
While "it is the business of legislators and executives to be popular[,...8
it is the business of judges to be indifferent to unpopularity."
Moreover, elected judges serve the rule of law and the Constitution and
not a constituency.89 Justice Stevens's recognition of the uniqueness of
the judiciary keeps states from the "all or nothing choice of abandoning
judicial elections or having elections in which anything goes."9" Even
if an observer cannot determine whether the basis for an elected judge's
decision was the rule of law or political expediency, a state may presume
that its judges adjudicate nobly.9 However, a judicial candidate who
announces his position on an issue to win votes clearly has shown either
a lack of impartiality or a lack of understanding of the need for
upholding public trust in the judiciary.92

81. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). See discussion infra of the private Georgia
Committee for Ethical Judicial Campaigns in Parts IV.A-B.
82. 536 U.S. at 795 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
83. Id. at 797 (Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
84. Id. (Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
85. Id. (Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
86. Id. (Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
87. Id. at 798 (Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
88. Id. (Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
89. Id. at 799 (Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
90. Id. at 799-800 (Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
91. Id. at 800 (Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
92. Id. (Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
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According to Justice Stevens, the announce clause served the interests
of impartiality even when impartiality is narrowly defined as the
absence of bias toward a party.93 The announce clause also served the
interests of impartiality when impartiality is broadly defined as openAlthough the Court declared the announce clause
mindedness.
underinclusive, it did not properly apply the open-mindedness definition.9 4 Open-mindedness is not comprised of a large number of
expressed views in the judicial candidate's earlier legal career. Rather,
open-mindedness is epitomized by the ability to re-evaluate legal
opinions and to apply the rule of law after an adversarial presentation.
The very purpose of the announce clause was to prohibit statements that
demonstrated that a judicial candidate was not open-minded on a
particular issue.95
The judicial branch's legitimacy hangs on its "reputation for impartiality and nonpartisanship."9" This carefully cultivated reputation is
ruined when a judicial candidate announces a position on a legal issue.
A "'judge's fidelity must be 97to enforcement of the rule of law regardless
of perceived popular will."'
Justice Ginsburg's Dissent. Justice Ginsburg wrote to
6.
emphasize the fundamental difference between judges and elected
representatives. 9 Judges are charged with deciding "'individual cases
and controversies' on individual records, neutrally applying legal
principles, and, when necessary, 'standing up to what is generally
supreme in a democracy: the popular will."'99 An independent and
0
impartial judiciary can protect some subjects from the majority.'
Justice Ginsburg "would differentiate elections for political offices, in
which the First Amendment holds full sway, from elections designed to
select those whose office it is to administer justice without respect to
The rationale behind the majority's reasoning fails
persons."' 01
02
The majorbecause judges are not elected to serve constituencies.

93. Id. (Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting). .
94. Id. at 801 (Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
95. Id. (Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
96. Id. at 802 (Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
97. Id. at 803 (Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting) (quoting Paul J.
De Muniz, Politicizing State JudicialElections: A Threat to Judicial Independence, 38
WILLAMETTE L. REv. 367, 387 (2002)).
98. Id. (Ginsburg, Stevens, Souter & Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
99. Id. at 804 (Ginsburg, Stevens, Souter & Breyer, JJ., dissenting) (citations omitted).
100. Id. (Ginsburg, Stevens, Souter & Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
101. Id. at 805 (Ginsburg, Stevens, Souter & Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
102. Id. at 806 (Ginsburg, Stevens, Souter & Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
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ity's flawed reasoning is demonstrated by their reliance upon only
Moreover, Minnesota's
legislative and executive election cases."°3
choice of nonpartisan judicial elections is not a choice to dispense with
the goal of an independent judiciary. Instead, Minnesota created its own
balance of limited judicial accountability with the judicial10 4 election
integrity safeguards written in the Code of Judicial Conduct.
The Court misrepresented the announce clause's meaning as
interpreted by the Eighth Circuit and the Minnesota Supreme
Court.'0 ' This Court must accept the interpretation of the state law
given by that state's highest court.'0 6 The announce clause prohibited
only statements about how a judicial candidate would decide disputed
issues. The announce clause allowed statements of historical fact and
qualified general statements. Neither the Eighth Circuit nor the
Minnesota Supreme Court limited the discussion of past decisions."0 7
Thus, the announce clause was "more tightly bounded ... than the
Court acknowledges."' 0 '
In this case the announce clause did not nullify an election. Wersal
was neither disciplined nor sanctioned, and the Lawyers Board never
intended to do so. The announce clause did not stifle the robust
information transfer from judicial candidate to voter.'0 9
The Court also ignored the interrelationship of the announce clause
and the pledges and promises clause. The two clauses should be
Any judge who breaks campaign pledges or
analyzed together."0
promises risks being branded a liar."' "A judge in this position
therefore may be thought to have a 'direct, personal, substantial, [and]
pecuniary interest in ruling against certain litigants, for she may be
voted off the bench and thereby lose her salary and emoluments unless
she honors the pledge that secured her election."'1 2 The pledges and
promises clause stops quid pro quos. The announce clause backstops the
pledges and promises clause." 3 "Semantic sanitizing of the candidate's
commitment would not ... diminish its pernicious effects on actual and

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. (Ginsburg, Stevens, Souter & Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
Id. at 807-09 (Ginsburg, Stevens, Souter & Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
Id. at 809 (Ginsburg, Stevens, Souter & Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
Id. (Ginsburg, Stevens, Souter & Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
Id. at 809-10 (Ginsburg, Stevens, Souter & Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
Id. at 810 (Ginsburg, Stevens, Souter & Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
Id. at 811-12 (Ginsburg, Stevens, Souter & Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
Id. at 812 (Ginsburg, Stevens, Souter & Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
Id. at 816 (Ginsburg, Stevens, Souter & Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
Id. (Ginsburg, Stevens, Souter & Breyer, JJ., dissenting) (citations omitted).
Id. at 818-20 (Ginsburg, Stevens, Souter & Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
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perceived judicial impartiality."114 While the majority in White held
the announce clause unconstitutional, it did not address other canons of
the 1972 ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct.115 Relying upon the
majority's decision in White, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals also
attacked bans on personal solicitation ofjudicial campaign contributions
and the issuance of cease and desist requests in Weaver v. Bonner."6
B.

Weaver v. Bonner

1. Factual Background. In October of 2002, the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals held, inter alia, in Weaver v. Bonner. 7 that (1) Canon
7(B)(1)(d) of the Georgia Code of Judicial Conduct," 8 precluding false,
misleading, or deceptive candidate speech, was overbroad and violated
the First Amendment; (2) Canon 7(B)(2) of the Georgia Code of Judicial
Conduct," 9 prohibiting judicial candidates from personally soliciting
campaign contributions and from personally soliciting publicly stated
support, violated the First Amendment; and (3) the issuance of a cease
and desist request under Rule 27 of the Judicial Qualifications
Commission ("JQC") 120 was an impermissible prior restraint of protected speech.' 2 '
Georgia Supreme Court justices are popularly elected. The JQC and
its Special Committee on Judicial Election Campaign Intervention
("Special Committee") ensured that the judicial elections complied with
Canon 7(B) of the Georgia Code of Judicial Conduct. 22 Canon 7(B)(1)(d) stated that judicial candidates
shall not use or participate in the use of any form of public communication which the candidate knows or reasonably should know is false,
fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, or which contains a material
misrepresentation of fact or law or omits a fact necessary to make the
communication considered as a whole not materially misleading or
which is likely to create an unjustified expectation about results the
candidate can achieve.' 23

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id. at 819 (Ginsburg, Stevens, Souter &
Id. at 788 (Ginsburg, Stevens, Souter &
309 F.3d 1312, 1321-24 (2002).
309 F.3d 1312.
GA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon
GA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon
GA. R. JUD. QUAL. COMM'N 27.
309 F.3d at 1321-24.
Id. at 1315.
Id.

Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
Breyer, JJ., dissenting).

7(B)(1)(d).
7(B)(2).
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Canon 7(B)(2) stated that judicial candidates "shall not themselves
solicit campaign funds, or solicit publicly stated support."124 Canon
7(B)(2) allowed the judicial candidate's election committee to perform
these solicitations for him. 121 JQC Rule 27126 permitted the JQC to
enforce Canon 7 during judicial elections. The Special Committee
investigated potential violations of Canon 7 and could issue a confidential cease and desist request to a judicial candidate who violated Canon
7. If the judicial candidate disregarded the request or continued to
violate Canon 7, the Special Committee may release a public statement
describing the candidate's existing Canon 7 violations and his refusal to
comply with the cease and desist request. The Code of Judicial Conduct
also applies to a lawyer who is a judicial candidate. 127Lawyers who
violate the Code of Judicial Conduct may be disbarred.
In 1998 George M. Weaver ran against and lost to the incumbent
Georgia Supreme Court candidate, the Honorable Leah Sears. Weaver's
campaign literature included a brochure ("first brochure") discussing
Justice Sears's position on homosexual marriage, traditional morality,
and the electric chair. After receiving two complaints, the Special
Committee reviewed the first brochure. The Special Committee decided
12
that the first brochure, on its face, may violate Canon 7(B)(1)(d). 8
Weaver responded to the complaints, and the Special Committee
"concluded that portions of the first brochure violated Canon 7(B)(1)(d)
and issued a confidential cease and desist request."129 Weaver revised
the first brochure and circulated a second brochure. 3 '
Later, Weaver broadcast a television advertisement.11 After getting

124. Id (citing GA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(B)(2)).
125. Id.
126. GA. R. JUD. QUAL. COMM'N 27.

127. 309 F.3d at 1315-16.
128. Id. at 1316.
129. Id. The JQC concluded the following statements violated Canon 7(B)(1)(d): "(1)
'She would require the State to license same-sex marriages[;]' (2) 'She has referred to
traditional moral standards as "pathetic and disgraceful[;]"' [and] (3) 'Justice Sears has
called the electric chair "silly" with the words 'THE DEATH PENALTY" in an adjacent
column."' Id.
130. Id. The second brochure language included "(1) 'She has stated that "it is not yet
a perfect world" because "lesbian and gay couples in America cannot legally marry[;]"' (2)
'When the Supreme Court upheld a traditional moral standard, she said the result was
"pathetic and disgraceful[;]"' and (3) 'Justice Sears says she supports the death penalty but
has called the electric chair "silly."'" Id. at 1316-17.
131. Id. at 1317. The television ad included
(1) The narrator states: "What does Justice Sears stand for? Same sex marriage."
This statement is made while a graphic shows: "Same Sex Marriage."
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three complaints about the television advertisement, the Special
Committee decided the television advertisement violated the earlier
cease and desist request.3 2 Six days before the election, the Special
Committee "issued a public statement to the media ... which stated that
Weaver had 'intentionally and blatantly' violated the original cease and
desist request and deliberately engaged in 'unethical, unfair, false and
intentionally deceptive' campaign practices."1 33 The JQC also reported
Weaver to the State Bar of Georgia for possible disciplinary action.'
Weaver filed a federal lawsuit, alleging that Canons 7(B)(1)(d) and
7(B)(2) and JQC Rule 27 violated the First Amendment, facially and as
applied. Weaver requested, inter alia, injunctive relief and a special
election. The district court denied Weaver's request for a special
After cross motions for summary judgment, the district
election.'
court decided that "Canon 7(B)(1)(d) is facially unconstitutional because
it 'chills' core political speech and violates the overbreadth doctrine by
prohibiting false statements of fact made without knowledge or reckless
disregard of falsity." 3 ' However, the district court found that Canon
7(B)(2) and JQC Rule 27 satisfied the First Amendment because they
were narrowly tailored to preserve the compelling state interest of
"preserving the integrity and independence of Georgia's judiciary." 7
The district court also found that JQC Rule 27 allowed Weaver adequate
process. 3Weaver appealed and the JQC cross-appealed to the Eleventh
Circuit. 1
The Eleventh Circuit explained that the overbreadth doctrine
"permitt[ed] the facial invalidation of laws that inhibit the exercise of
First Amendment rights if the impermissible applications of the law are
substantial when 'judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate
sweep."" 3 9 The court noted that the overbreadth doctrine protects the
40
A
public from the statute's chilling effect on protected speech.

(2) The narrator states: "She's questioned the constitutionality of laws prohibiting
sex with children under fourteen." This statement is made while a graphic shows:
"Questioned Laws Protecting Our Children."
(3) The narrator states: "And she called the electric chair silly." This statement
is made while a graphic shows: "Called Electric Chair Silly."
Id.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id.
Id (citations omitted).
Id.
Id. at 1317-18.
Id. at 1318.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 52 (1999)).
Id.
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candidate's speech belongs inside the core of First Amendment protection, so the proper standard to apply is strict scrutiny.14 ' Under the
is "(1)
strict scrutiny test, the government must prove that the statute
142
narrowly tailored, to serve (2) a compelling state interest."
The JQC asserted compelling state interests
2. Canon 7(B)(1)(d).
of "'preserving the integrity, impartiality, and independence of the
judiciary' and 'ensuring the integrity of the electoral process and
protecting voters from confusion and undue influence. ' 143 The Eleventh Circuit stated that Canon 7(B)(1)(d) was not narrowly tailored
because the Canon does not give protected speech enough breathing
space.'"4 A narrowly tailored restriction on candidate speech must
espouse an actual malice standard. 145 Actual malice, as defined in
New York Times v. Sullivan,'48 is shown when false statements are
made with "knowledge of falsity or with reckless disregard as to whether
on negligently made false
the statement is false." 47 Thus, restrictions
4
statements violate the First Amendment. 1
The Eleventh Circuit relied on the United States Supreme Court
49
that invalidated a state law because
decision in Brown v. Hartlage1
the law punished "false factual statements that were made without
knowledge of their falsity or reckless disregard as to whether they were
Facially, Georgia's Canon 7(B)(1)(d) chilled more core
false." 5 °
political speech than the act in Brown because the canon "not only
prohibit[ed] false statements knowingly or recklessly made, it also
prohibit[ed] false statements negligently made and true statements that
are misleading or deceptive or contain a material misrepresentation or
omit a material fact or create an unjustified expectation about results.", .'
Additionally, the Eleventh Circuit stated that the Canon did not
substantially advance Georgia's interest in impartiality because the
general practice of electing judges, not just particular campaign practices

141. Id. at 1318-19.
142. Id. at 1319 (quoting White, 536 U.S. at 793).
143.
144.
145.

Id (quoting Appellees' Brief at 33).
Id.
Id.

146. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
147. Weaver, 309 F.3d at 1319 (quoting New York Times, 376 U.S. at 280).
148. Id.
149. 456 U.S. 45 (1982).
150.
151.

Weaver, 309 F.3d at 1320 (citing Brown, 465 U.S. at 61).
Id.
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of judicial candidates, risks impartiality concerns. 15 2 Georgia brought
the problem of judicial impartiality upon itself by choosing to conduct
contested judicial elections.15 3 The Eleventh Circuit refused to adopt
a lower standard for protection of core speech for judicial elections than
Instead, the court suggested "the
for other political elections.'
standard for judicial elections should be the same as the standard for
legislative and executive elections."155 Noting that state court judges
have the power to make common law and mold the state constitution,
the Eleventh Circuit agreed with the Supreme Court's majority decision
in White and stated that any distinction between judicial elections and
other political elections does not justify greater restrictions on judicial
campaigns. 5
The Eleventh Circuit held that Canon 7(B)(1)(d) prohibited much more
157
speech than was needed to further Georgia's compelling interests.
State supreme courts had previously applied the Brown standard and
struck judicial canons as unconstitutional that were similar to Georgia's
canon. 15 Specifically, in Butler v. Alabama Judicial Inquiry Commission, 5 9 the Alabama Supreme Court held an equivalent canon to be
unconstitutional because it prohibited negligently made false statements
and "true statements that a reasonable person would find misleading or
deceptive.""'0 Likewise, in In re Chmura,'6 ' the Michigan Supreme
Court struck an analogous canon because the canon was "not narrowly
tailored to serve the state's compelling interest.""6 2 By striking the
canon, the court narrowed the canon's scope of coverage from statements
and factual omissions that were found to be "misleading or deceptive ' to the "knowin[g], or with reckless disregard, use or participat[ion] in the use of any form of [false] public communication."6 4
3. Canon 7(B)(2). The Eleventh Circuit also held that Canon
7(B)(2) was not narrowly tailored. 5 The court stated that Canon

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1320-21.
Id. at 1321.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1322.
802 So. 2d 207 (Ala. 2001).
Weaver, 309 F.3d at 1322.
608 N.W.2d 31 (Mich. 2000).
Id. at 38.
Id. at 33.
Id. at 36.
Weaver, 309 F.3d at 1322.
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7(B)(2) "completely chill[ed]" judicial candidates from personally
soliciting campaign contributions and publicly stated support.'66 Again
the court noted that Georgia created its own impartiality concerns when
the state decided to elect judges.'6 7 The court acknowledged that a
candidate to elected office must raise campaign contributions and seek
endorsements. 6 ' Unless all judicial candidates are independently
wealthy, the court noted that they will be forced to pursue campaign
The court maintained that fundraising activities alone
fundraising.'
do not necessarily suggest that a judicial candidate will be biased if
elected. 70 Furthermore, the court stated that the risk that judges will
be biased toward the special interest groups and big donors who funded
their campaigns does not disappear if fundraising is done by the judge's
campaign committee.'' Thus, the court held that Canon 7(B)(2) does
not satisfy strict scrutiny because it completely chills a judicial
candidates speech without advancing Georgia's interest in judicial
impartiality.172

4. JQC Rule 27. Finally, the Eleventh Circuit held that "[tihe
issuance of a Rule 27 cease and desist request, which prohibits a judicial
candidate from engaging in certain speech, [was] an impermissible prior
restraint on protected expression."' 7' All prior restraints must overcome a heavy presumption against their constitutionality. 74 Prior
restraints include ""'administrative and judicial orders forbidding
certain communications when issued in advance of the time that such
5
Remedial injunctions, however, are
communications are to occur."''" 7176

not classified as prior restraints.
The court held that a JQC Rule 27 cease and desist request is akin to
an injunction because it prohibits judicial candidate speech.177 A JQC
Rule 27 cease and desist request was remedial only to the extent that it
kept judicial candidates from "repeating verbatim past statements that

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1322-23.
Id.
Id. at 1323.

Id.
Id. (quoting Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 550 (1993)).
Id.
Id.
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the JQC ha[d] found to be false, misleading, and deceptive."" v' However, the court held the JQC Rule 27 cease and desist request was also an
unconstitutional prior restraint because it banned future statements that
had yet to be found false, misleading, or deceptive by the JQC.' 79 The
JQC determined merely that the televison advertisements were similar
enough to the Rule 27 cease and desist request it had already sent to
Weaver. The JQC made its confidential cease and desist request public
and delivered a press release calling Weaver unethical without
determining whether the television advertisements were actually false,
misleading, or deceptive.180 The JQC's "damaging public statement...
had the imprimatur of the government."''
Weaver spoke even after he received the JQC Rule 27 cease and desist
request. 112 The court opined that many candidates would stop speaking." 3 Their core speech would be chilled by the threat of discipline
or disbarrment upon a violation of the cease and desist request. A
judicial candidate must also wonder whether his revised speech violates
the cease and desist request." 4 The Eleventh Circuit held that
because the JQC Rule 27 cease and desist request did not overcome the
heavy presumption against the request's constitutionality, the cease and
desist request was an unconstitutional prior restraint. 8 5 The changes
wrought by the decisions in White and Weaver are now reflected in
Georgia judicial selection law.
III.
A.

A HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF GEORGIA JUDICIAL SELECTION LAW

Georgia Court Reform History

A clarion call for judicial reform went forth in the May 1966 issue of
the Georgia State Bar Journal.8 6 Judge Robert H. Hall conducted a
historical survey of the Georgia judicial system. In 1966 the majority of
Georgia judges were not lawyers, but laymen.8 7 All judicial selection
was done by some form of political method. 188 Judges either came to

178. Id.
179. Id.
180.

Id. at 1323-24.

181. Id. at 1324.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Hall, supra note 1, at 389.
Id. at 393.

188. Id.
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the bench by winning a partisan election or by political appoint89
ment."
As a result, Judge Hall asserted that all Georgia judges were
in politics to one degree or another.19 Nonetheless, judges were only
in politics because of the workings of the judicial system that someone
else created.1 9'
Judge Hall noted that most Georgia judges had to overcome political
opposition every four years. 192 The short judicial term paradox hurt
both the lawyer turned judge and the judge turned lawyer.9 3 A
lawyer who was elected to be a judge had to abandon his or her private
practice, so that a new judge's continued remuneration depended
A
completely upon success in the rapidly approaching election.'
judge who lost the election and was once again a lawyer in private
practice had to build up a law practice from scratch all over again. 93
The double-edged effect of short judicial terms was that a judge had to
about the chances of
be immersed in politics and was forever uncertain
196
winning re-election to a judicial position.
Significant judicial reform could only be achieved, according to Judge
Hall, once the judiciary is made independent.' 9 Only then can an
independent judge use courage and honest judgment instead of political
Theoretically, appellate judges were popularly electexpediency.9 8
20 0
However, most were appointed or self-selected to office.
ed. " '
Incumbent appellate judges were rarely, if ever, defeated. 20 ' The
theory of popular election was a factual fallacy: appellate judges were
either politically appointed or self-selected. 0 2
Judge Hall concluded that judges should be selected according to their
merit, but outside of a political system. 20 3 A non-politically selected
merit.20 4
judge should serve a lengthy term which allows for proof of
The judge should then run unopposed in an up or down retention

189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 393-95.
Id. at 395.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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election. The State Bar of Georgia has proposed the Missouri plan since
1896. °5
Historically, Georgia's methods of judicial selection have been a source
of great disagreement.2 0 ' Before 1798, judges were appointed by the
legislature or the governor.0 7 Once the Constitution of 1798 was
adopted, nearly all judges were publicly elected.20 " Georgia Supreme
Court justices were still appointed.2 0 9 The judicial selection mechanism has changed repeatedly over time: to executive appointment under
the 1861 Constitution, to legislative appointment under the 1865
Constitution, to executive appointment with confirmation by the senate
under the 1868 Constitution, to legislative appointment under the initial
1877 Constitution, and to public election under the amended 1877
21 0
The 1983 Constitution
Constitution and the 1945 Constitution.
the
provides for the nonpartisan election of all judges and justices of
court.2 1 1
superior courts, state courts, court of appeals, and supreme
The proposed judicial reforms of 1966 were incorporated into a new
draft constitution and a new judicial article. 2 Both resolutions died
in a House committee.2 1 ' A 1969 Judiciary Article Subcommittee was
14
A mandatory JNC
then taxed with drafting a new judicial article.
1 5
Next, a permissive JNC with executive
was narrowly rejected.
appointment of judicial vacancies survived the Subcommittee but
2 16
Nevertheless, the
floundered in the full Revision Commission.
2 7
The House
Subcommittee adopted a proscribed permissive JNC.
Judiciary Committee promptly reversed the Subcommittee and adopted
the mandatory JNC.2 1 ' The mandatory JNC died again on the floor of
the full House. 1 9 The House did pass provisions for a uniform court

205. Id.
206. JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION IN GEORGIA: A CASE STUDY 7 (Inst. of Gov't, Univ. of
Ga. ed., 1972).
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 7-8.
211. George D. Busbee, An Overview of the New Georgia Constitution, 35 MERCER L.
REV. 1, 10 (1983).
212. Carr G. Dodson, JudicialRecommendations and the Legislature, 6 GA. STATE B.J.
391 (1970).
213. Id. at 392.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 393.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 393-94.
219. Id. at 394.
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system.22 ° A uniform court system achieved constitutional status in
the Georgia Constitution of 1983.221
B.

Current Georgia Judicial Selection Law

1.
Constitutional and Statutory Authority. The Georgia
Constitution provides that "[aill superior court and state court judges
shall be elected on a nonpartisan basis for a term of four years. All
Justices of the Supreme Court and the Judges of the Court of Appeals
222
shall be elected on a nonpartisan basis for a term of six years.,
According to section 21-2-138 of the Official Code of Georgia ("O.C.G.A."),
judicial candidates's names
shall be placed on the ballot in a nonpartisan election to be held and
conducted jointly with the general primary in each even-numbered year
... No candidates for any such office shall be nominated by a political
party or by a petition as a candidate of a political body or as an
independent candidate ... [Judicial elections] shall conform as nearly
as practicable to the procedures governing general primaries and
general elections; and such general primary and general election
procedures as are necessary to complete this nonpartisan election
process shall be adopted in a manner consistent with such nonpartisan
elections.223
The Georgia Constitution also confers the power to fill judicial vacancies
"by appointment of the Governor. "2 2' The governor's appointee does
not have to stand for re-election "until January 1 of the year following
the next general election which is more than six month's after such
was interpretperson's appointment."22 5 This constitutional authority
22 6
ed by the state supreme court in Perdue v. Palmour.
2. Perdue v. Palmour. The Georgia Supreme Court recently
clarified the six month provision of Judicial Article VI of the 1983
Georgia Constitution.22 7 On April 23, 2004, the Chattooga County
State Court Judge and the solicitor-general resigned their positions.
Each then qualified for the other's former office. After the candidates

220. Id.
221. Busbee, supra note 211, at 10.
222. GA. CONST. art. VI, § 7, para. 1 (emphasis added).
223. O.C.G.A. § 21-2-138 (2003).
224. GA. CONST. art. VI, § 7, para. 3.
225. GA. CONST. art. VI, § 7, para. 4.
226. 278 Ga. 217, 600 S.E.2d 370 (2004).
227. Id. at 217, 600 S.E.2d at 370.
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had started campaigning, Chattooga County Election Superintendent
received notice that Governor Perdue had accepted the resignations and
planned on filling the vacancies by appointment. Before the Superintendent could cancel the elections and return the qualifying fees, state court
judge candidate Albert C. Palmour filed a complaint. The Chattooga
Citing the six
Superior Court ordered that the elections proceed.22
month provision, the Governor asserted his "appointees would serve
until January 1, 2007" because any appointment would be made within
six months of the upcoming 2004 general election. 9 Quoting a 1986
Attorney General opinion, the court explained that
someone appointed to fill a vacancy occurring at the beginning of a sixyear term will not be immune from voter consideration for that entire
period; he would have to run in the next general election; [however,]
someone appointed between June and November of a general election
year would not have to run immediately and would have a little over
two years to demonstrate his qualifications as a judge or state's
This is a practical balance between democracy and stabiliattorney.
0
23

ty.

The court did not resolve the issue by a subjective analysis of the
strength of the governor's appointment power. 2 1 Rather, the court
examined the unequivocal constitutional mandate expounded by the six
month provision of the 1983 Georgia Constitution.232 Thus, the court
required the Election Superintendent to cancel the elections for state
court judge and solicitor-general.2"'
Usually, before a governor exercises his constitutional judicial
appointment powers, the judicial candidates are screened by a Judicial
Nominating Commission ("JNC"). In its various incarnations, the JNC
has swung from a relatively non-politicized body under the Carter,
Busbee, and Harris administrations to a perceived politicized body under
the Barnes administration and back to its non-politicized origins under
the Perdue administration.
3. Executive Orders. The failures of judicial reform efforts in the
late 1960s led to Governor Jimmy Carter's creation of a Commission of

228. Id. at 217-18, 600 S.E.2d at 371-72.
229. Id. at 218, 600 S.E.2d at 371.
230. Id. at 220, 600 S.E.2d at 373 (quoting Op. Att'y Gen. 86-31 (1986) (quoting
Transcripts of Meetings, Select Comm. on Constitutional Revision, Legislative Overview
Comm., Vol. III, Aug. 7, 1981)).
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
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Judicial Processes in 1971."4 The Commission's report concluded that
the most important part of the judicial process is judicial selection
because the law is a direct function of the judges who dispense it. The
Commission advised a nonpartisan nominating commission. In the
spring of 1971, Governor Carter used the State Bar's Executive
Committee to rate nominees for superior court and, later, appellate
vacancies. Questionnaires appeared in the summer and interviews were
held in the fall. Following this experimental judicial nominee screening,
Governor Carter created the forerunner of the JNC in his Appellate
Judicial Selection Committee by a December 1971 Executive Order.
Despite its name, Governor Carter used the Commission to appoint trial
judges for all courts of record."'
a. The CarterJNC Model. After the Executive Committee grew in
size and the Appellate Judicial Selection Committee swelled to the
unwieldy size of 18 members, Governor Carter issued a new Executive
Order in June 1973. The name of the Committee was changed to the
Judicial Nominating Commission and its membership was limited to ten
people. Governor Carter appointed five members and the other five
became members through the offices they held in the State Bar." 6 In
a 1974 Law Day Address, Jimmy Carter stated, "I have refrained
completely from making any judicial appointments on the basis of
political support or other factors, and have chosen, in every instance,
[judges] on the basis of merit analysis by a highly competent, open,
qualified group of distinguished Georgians. "237 In 1975 Governor
George Busbee continued the JNC in the Carter fashion. In 1983
Governor Joe Frank Harris adopted the JNC in an unchanged format.
Governors Carter, Busbee, and Harris picked all of their judicial
nominees from among JNC recommendations.3 s
Originally, the JNC evaluated only the names of judicial candidates
that had been "submitted through the Governor's office."2 39 Gradually,
vacancy notification expanded and candidates realized they could
nominate themselves for any vacancy. Interviews were first held around
the state and later centralized in Atlanta. By 1979, the eight procedural

234. A. Gus Cleveland, The JudicialNominating and Appointment Processin Georgia:
1971-1990, 27 GA. STATE B.J. 54 (1990).
235. Id. at 54-55.
236. Id. at 55-56.
237. Governor Jimmy Carter, Law Day Address to Senator Kennedy and the Joseph
H. Lumpkin Law School at the University of Georgia (May 4, 1974), reprinted in JIMMY
CARTER, 1 THE PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN 1976 24-5 (1978).
238. Cleveland, supra note 234, at 55-56.
239. Id. at 57.
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steps to judicial selection solidified. The Carter, Busbee, and Harris
administrations all roughly followed these same steps. First, all state
bar members and relevant members of the public receive a letter
notifying them of a vacancy or newly created position and asking for
nominations. Publication by official newsletters in Fulton and DeKalb
counties follows and individual bar associations are also notified.
Second, any Georgia citizen can make a nomination by notifying the
JNC chairman or any JNC member. So, a lawyer may nominate himself
or herself. The media does not learn who has nominated whom. Third,
the JNC chairman writes a letter to each nominee and encloses a
questionnaire. Each nominee is requested to complete a questionnaire,
give the JNC access to disciplinary matters, send a photo, and provide
a legal writing sample. The nominee is given an interview time and
place. Fourth, the JNC investigates the nominees. The JNC welcomes
letters from people and organizations with specific ties to the nominees.
JNC members confidentially discuss nominees with other lawyers,
judges, and nonlawyers. Fifth, each nominee is interviewed for about
fifteen minutes. The JNC does not inquire after a nominee's judicial
philosophy. Sixth, the JNC evaluates each nominee immediately after
all the interviews for the position have ended. By secret ballot, the JNC
rates nominees as well qualified, qualified, not qualified special and not
qualified. Multiple balloting may be necessary to narrow the pool to the
list of five that is submitted to the Governor. Seventh, the JNC delivers
a list of candidates to the Governor along with copies of the candidates's
questionnaires and a tally of the balloting. The JNC does not disclose
the list outside the Governor's office. Eighth, the Governor interviews
the listed candidates and makes his selection.24 °
b. The Barnes JNC model. The dignity of the judicial system is vital
to its very integrity. Once the public perception of fair and impartial
judges is shaken, the rule of law becomes suspect. "[Wihen a candidate
for a court seat gives money to the governor, 'it looks
24 1 bad and smells
happens.'
it
time
every
me
dumbfounds
just
bad. It
In 2002, Governor Roy E. Barnes selected Marvin S. Arrington, Sr. for
a Fulton Superior Court seat.2 42 Arrington donated $10,000 to Barnes's re-election campaign only four days before Barnes's JNC began

240. Id. at 57-59.
241. Jonathan Ringel & Rachel Tobin Ramos, Appellate CandidatesKick in to Barnes,
FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP., Oct. 25, 2002, at 1 (quoting Georgia State University law
professor Roy M. Sobelson).
242. Jonathan Ringel, Arrington Gets a Judgeship, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP., Jan.
18, 2002, at 1.
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interviewing candidates for the Fulton Superior judgeship. Barnes
picked Arrington from the list of candidates his JNC provided him.243
Responding to intimations that Arrington bought a judgeship, a Barnes
spokeswoman stated "Governor Barnes picks the candidate who is the
most qualified."244 A Barnes statement detailed a long friendship
Moreover, Arrington came wellbetween Barnes and Arrington.
recommended in a letter written by former U.S. Attorney General Griffin
B. Bell.245 While L. Ray Patterson, a legal ethics professor at the
University of Georgia School of Law, admitted that Arrington "exercised
poor judgment," Patterson retained a "high regard for [Arrington]. 2 48
Furthermore, Arrington's $10,000 donation was but a fraction of
Barnes's cash campaign pot of $10.7 million.24 7
Seven out of forty-four candidates for an open Georgia Court of
Appeals seat made campaign contributions to Barnes after Barnes's JNC
started the candidate search. Four candidates donated $5000 and two
donated $250. Barnes could have avoided criticism if he had told
nominees not to donate during the selection process. As a whole, the
candidates/donors had faith in the integrity of the JNC and didn't think
campaign donations would affect the selection process. A Barnes
spokeswoman emphatically denied that campaign contributions were
seventeen
considered in the qualifications process. Barnes raised almost
248
percent of his campaign pot from the legal community.
Barnes also fomented controversy in 2000 when he bypassed the JNC
and directly appointed his former executive counsel, Penny Brown
Reynolds, to the Fulton State Court bench. Barnes dismissed thirty
years of tradition and called the JNC a "charade" because he knew who
2 49
he was going to appoint before the JNC selection process began.
While Barnes's direct selection did not violate any laws, critics suggested
that his direct selection was necessary because the chosen candidate
wasn't qualified enough to be chosen by the traditional JQC procedure.25 o
As long as the JNC is a creature of the governor, the judicial selection
process remains vulnerable to controversies that connect judicial
appointments with campaign fundraising or executive caprice. In 2005

243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
COUNTY
250.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Ringel & Ramos, supra note 241, at 1.
Janet L. Conley, How Roy Barnes Became the Architect of His Own Defeat, FULTON
DAILY REP., Dec. 26, 2002, at 1.
Symposium, supra note 16, at 874.
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Representative Mary Margaret Oliver introduced a Democratic ethics
bill, House Bill 47, that would add a new code section. 5 1 Proposed
O.C.G.A. section 45-12-61 would render a person ineligible to fill a
judicial vacancy if the person donated to the governor's campaign thirty
days before the vacancy announcement or any time after the vacancy
announcement. 2
c. The Perdue JNC model. On June 11, 2003, Governor Sonny
Perdue issued an executive order creating the Judicial Nominating
Commission for the State of Georgia.2 5 3 The order recognized that the
quality of the Georgia judicial system depends on the elected and
appointed judges within it. 2 4 The order called for judicial vacancies
to be filled by highly capable candidates from a wide cross-section of the
state.255 JNC members would be an aid to the Governor's discretion. 5 According to the executive order, JNC members shall
have demonstrable knowledge of the judicial system and experience in
the needs and operation of Georgia courts. Members who are members
of the bar shall have at least ten years of experience relevant to the
courts as former judges, former magistrates, trial counsel, government
counsel, or corporate counsel and shall be members of the State Bar of
Georgia in good standing. Members who are not members of the Bar
shall be familiar with the attributes that best qualify a person for
appointment as a judicial officer.... The [JNC] shall consist of
members appointed by the Governor to serve at the pleasure of the
Governor . . . . [11n the event of a judicial vacancy, the Commission
shall advertise the vacancy and elicit applications of qualified persons
to fill the vacancy; meet and consider persons for submission as
nominees according to merit and law and shall recommend to the
Governor257five individuals which it finds qualified for each judicial
vacancy.

In 2003 Governor Perdue appointed Michael J. Bowers as the JNC
Bowers stated he
chairman along with seventeen other members.5
"often has been disappointed with the way the [Barnes] panel conducted

251. H.B. 47, 148th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2005), availableat http://www.legis.
state.ga.us/legis/2005_06/fulltext/hb47.htm.
252. Id.

253. Ga. Exec. Order (June 11, 2003), Sonny Perdue, Governor, availableat http://www
.gov.state.ga.us/ExOrders/06_1.0301.pdf.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id.
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its business."" 9 Before Perdue was inaugurated, Bowers and the
governor-elect were already discussing ways to improve the JNC.26 °
As a gubernatorial candidate, Perdue stated "he would seek to appoint
261
judges who are 'strong enough to stand up to the executive branch.'
Perdue criticized former Governor Barnes for undue meddling with the
between the Barnes
bench. Perdue also faulted the close relationship
262
administration and the State Bar of Georgia.
Perdue's executive counsel stated that Perdue "intend[ed] to rely
heavily" on JNC recommendations when making judicial appointments.26 3 Perdue's executive counsel also averred that because Perdue
wanted to consider all applicants on their merits, Perdue would not use
264
the JNC as a rubber stamp for pre-picked judicial appointees.
Moreover, chairman Bowers intended to ensure that "the judicial
nominating process [was] not politicized."26 5 While most of the newly
reconstituted JNC members are Republicans, the panel also includes
Attorney General Thurbert Baker, a Democrat. 266 Past JNCs have
included attorneys general as "ex-officio or de facto members, but the
governor is not required to appoint the AG" to the panel.267 To that
end, Bowers did not intend to exclude Democrats from nominee
slates.26 8
Bowers modified the JNC process by inviting special interest groups
to address the JNC. After reviewing the nominee applications, the
groups have a five minute comment period before the JNC begins the
nominee interviews.26 9 Bowers stated that more information is better,
259. R. Robin McDonald, Bowers Appointed Chairmanof JNC, FULTON COUNTY DAILY
REP., June 12, 2003, at 1.
260. Id.
261. Richmond Eustis, PerdueMay See FewerJudgesLeave the Bench, FULTON COUNTY
DAILY REP., Dec. 6, 2002, at 1.
262. Id.
263. R. Robin McDonald, Perdue Plans to Lean on JNC'sAdvice, Counsel Says, FULTON
COUNTY DAILY REP., June 18, 2003, at 1.
264. Id.
265. Id. Republicans took control of both houses of the state legislature and the
executive branch for the first time in 130 years following the 2004 election. Cameron
McWhirter, Republicans Run Electoral Table, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Nov. 4, 2004, at 1A.
Fears that resigning Democratic judges "would serve out their terms" to preclude the new
Republican governor from exercising his appointment powers have been proven largely
unfounded. Symposium, supra note 16, at 879-80. Only one Fulton County judge served

out a term. Id.
266.
267.
268.
269.
FULTON

McDonald, Perdue Plans to Lean on JNC's Advice, supra note 263, at 1.
Id.
Id.
Rachel Tobin Ramos, Fulton State Court Spot Draws Droves of Candidates,
COUNTY DAILY REP., July 22, 2003, at 1.
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"especially [if it comes] from groups who are interested in Georgia
judicial nominations."27 ° The groups addressing the JNC included the
Atlanta Bar Association, the Georgia Association for Women Lawyers,
and Fathers Are Parents Too, a lobbying association.271 When the
judicial selection method is election, not appointment, state judicial
canons govern judicial candidate campaign conduct. The Georgia canon
was changed to reflect the White and Weaver mandates.272
4. Georgia Supreme Court Order. On January 7, 2004, the
Georgia Supreme Court promulgated an order amending the Preamble
to the Georgia Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 7(A) and (B) of the
Georgia Code of Judicial Conduct, and Rule 27 of the Rules of the
Judicial Qualifications Commission.2 73 Pertinent parts of the amended
Preamble follow:
Every judge should strive to maintain the dignity appropriate to the
judicial office. The judge is an arbiter of facts and law for the
resolution of disputes and a highly visible symbol of government under
the rule of law. As a result, judges should be held to a higher
standard, and should aspire to conduct themselves with the dignity
accorded their esteemed position ....
The Code is to be construed so as not to impinge on the essential
independence ofjudges in making judicial decisions, or on judges' First
Amendment rights of freedom of speech and association ....
The mandatory provisions of the Canons and Sections describe the
basic minimal ethical requirements of judicial conduct. Judges and

candidates should strive to achieve the highest ethical standards, even
if not required by this Code.274
Under amended Canon 7(B)(1), a judicial candidate
(b) shall not make statements that commit the candidate with respect
to issues likely to come before the court; (c) shall not use or participate
in the publication of a false statement of fact concerning themselves or
their candidacies, or concerning any opposing candidate or candidacy,
falsity or with reckless disregard for
with knowledge of the statement's
27 5
the statement's truth or falsity.

270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Order of the Supreme Court of Georgia, Jan. 7, 2004, available at http://www2.
state.ga.us/courts/supreme/jqcL%207_27_or.html.
273. Id.
274. Id. (emphasis added).
275. Id.
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The Commentary explicitly addresses and references White.276
states that

It

rt]his Canon does not prohibit a judge or candidate from publicly
stating his or her personal views on disputed issues. 7 However,
judicial candidates are encouraged to emphasize in any public
statement
their duty to uphold the law regardless of their personal
278
views.
The Commentary implicitly addresses Weaver by listing the Chmura

standard of objective malice.27 9 The Commentary after Canon 7(B)(2),
which allows personal solicitation of campaign contributions, echos the
Preamble.28 ° Weaver is cited, but the Commentary encourages judicial
candidates to
use campaign committees to manage their campaign fundraising
because committees may better maintain campaign decorum and
reduce campaign activity that may cause requests for recusal or the
appearance of partisanship with respect to issues or the parties which
require recusal.8 1

The order also amended JQC Rule 27.282 A Special Committee still
Complaints and
investigates allegations of ethical misconduct. 23
responses to complaints will be kept confidential unless the Special
Committee determines that the allegations warrant intervention.8 4
The Special Committee is authorized to release to the complaining party
and the person complained against a non-confidential "Public Statement"
setting out believed existing violations. 2 5 The Special Committee does
The Special
not have the power to issue a cease and desist request.
Committee's public statement is only made public through the complaining party or the person being complained against.2 7 The Georgia
Supreme Court order brings the Georgia Code of Judicial Conduct into
First Amendment compliance, but the amended canons also carry

276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
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strongly worded recommendations for judicial candidates to follow the
judicial election law as it existed before the decisions in White and
Weaver.
IV.
A.

A REVIEW OF THE 2004 GEORGIA APPELLATE JUDICIAL ELECTIONS
Justice Sears Won Re-election to the Georgia Supreme Court

Georgia's first modern taste of a politicized judicial campaign came in
the 1998 contest between the Honorable Leah Sears and George M.
Weaver over a Georgia Supreme Court seat. The 1998 campaign
sparked the 2002 Eleventh Circuit decision in Weaver v. Bonner.25 5
After surviving one tough re-election campaign, Justice Sears was the
court justice to face the full ramifications of a post-White
first supreme
9
campaign. 1
Republican leaders openly recruited an opponent to Sears.2 9 ° Marty
Klein, a GOP spokesman, stated the Republican party wanted "someone
whose record reflects the values of Georgia." 291' Likewise, at a January
2004 Christian Coalition rally, Republican Governor Sonny Perdue called
for judges who would "represent mainstream Georgia, mainstream
292
Georgia values, and who will not try to legislate from the bench.,
Governor Perdue also suggested that Sears's record could not be
reconciled with the core values of the Christian Coalition.293
Although Mr. Weaver did not run again, his 1998 campaign strategy2a4 was dusted off and used again by 2004 challenger Grant Brantley. Brantley painted Sears as an ultra-liberal supporter of gay
marriage and out of step with Georgia's conservative voters. Brantley's
strategy reflected the national and state political climate.2 95 Anticipat-

288. 309 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2002).
289. The United States Supreme Court decided White on June 27, 2002. 536 U.S. 765.
Georgia Supreme Court Chief Justice Norman S. Fletcher and Justice Robert Benham
stood for re-election campaigns on August 20, 2002. Jonathan Ringel, Supreme Court
Unseals JudicialCandidates'Lips,FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP., June 28, 2002, at 1. Both
incumbent justices won their races. Jonathan Ringel, And They're Off - Again: Three
Races Go to Runoffs, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP., Aug. 22, 2002, at 1.
290. Jonathan Ringel, Republicans Recruiting for Sears Opponent, FULTON COUNTY
DAILY REP., Apr. 21, 2004, at 1.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. A national backlash by conservatives followed the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts's February 2004 advisory opinion which authorized gay marriage in
Massachusetts. In re Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565 (Mass. 2004).
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ing another highly politicized campaign for the state supreme court seat,
the Georgia Committee for Ethical Judicial Campaigns solicited pledges
from the appellate judicial candidates to follow pre-White and Weaver
judicial campaign ethics rules.
1. The Georgia Committee for Ethical Judicial Campaigns
Pledge. After Weaver, the Judicial Qualifications Commission ("JQC")
can no longer issue cease and desist requests to judicial candidates
whose campaigns proliferate false or misleading statements. To fill the
void left by the weakened JQC, the Georgia Committee for Ethical
Judicial Campaigns ("GCEJC"), a private organization, asked statewide
judicial candidates to sign a pledge to abide by the old (pre-White and
pre-Weaver) campaign behavior rules.2 9 R. William Ide III, chairman
of the GCEJC, listed the group's goals as "keep[ing] judicial candidates
from pre-committing to rulings they may be called on to make when on
the bench, from personally soliciting funds, and from making false
statements."2 97 Otherwise, Ide stated that the public would lose its
trust in the impartiality of the justice system.29 Justice Sears signed
the GCEJC pledge. 9 and promised to "run a dignified, ethical, and
appropriate campaign." 0 0
Refusing to "to sign away [his] First
Amendment rights," Brantley did not sign the GCEJC pledge. °1 He
also stated that the GCEJC will only protect incumbents. °2
2. The Christian Coalition Survey. During the campaign, the
Christian Coalition of Georgia distributed a survey to all statewide
judicial candidates. Quoting parts of United States Supreme Court
decisions, the survey asked candidates whether they agreed more with
the majority or the dissent. The survey topics included abortion,

During his successful re-election campaign, President George W. Bush floated a proposed
federal constitutional amendment that would have strictly defined marriage as being
between a man and a woman. Ringel, RepublicansRecruiting for Sears Opponent, supra
note 290, at 1. In the November 2004 election, Georgia voters overwhelmingly approved
a broad state constitutional amendment banning gay marriage. See http://www. sos.state.ga.us/elections/election-results/2004_1102/udicial.htm#qa.
296. Jonathan Ringel, Ex-Cobb Judge Brantley to Run Against Sears, FULTON COUNTY
DAILY REP., Apr. 27, 2004, at 1.
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Steven H. Pollak, Declare Stands on Social Issues, Coalition Asks Hopefuls,
FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP., May 14, 2004, at 1.
300. Ringel, Ex-Cobb Judge Brantley to Run Against Sears, supra note 296, at 1.
301. Id.
302. Id.
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homosexual conduct, public school graduation prayer, and parental
choice in education. 30 3
The GCEJC requested that judicial candidates not complete the
survey.30 4 Moreover, the GCEJC advised statewide judicial candidates
to "respectfully decline to answer" any questions about issues that "may
come before him or her as a judge" so that recusal will not be necessary.30 5 Chairman Ide warned that public confidence in the judiciary
will disappear 0if6 the public "believes [the judiciary's] rulings are
predetermined."
The survey responses, compiled into a voter guide, were distributed to
Sadie Fields, chairman of the
approximately 750,000 voters. 37
Christian Coalition of Georgia, "was disappointed" by the GCEJC's
reaction because "we do have a right to learn about the philosophy of
judicial candidates." 38 Former judicial candidate George Weaver agreed
that "judicial candidate questionnaires . .. are appropriate means for
providing voters with needed information about the general political
views and legal philosophies of candidates."0 9 Another commentator
insisted that "a judicial candidate who answers such questionnaires
becomes captive to the approval of special interest groups, religious or
otherwise."3 10
While Justice Sears did not respond to the Christian Coalition survey,
Grant Brantley advertised his conservative credentials in his responses
to the survey.311 For example, Brantley agreed with Justices Scalia
and Thomas's votes "against abortion rights, for clergy-led prayers at
for the constitutionality of laws criminalizpublic school graduations 3and
12
ing homosexual sodomy."

303. Steven H. Pollak, Respond to 5 Rulings, Hopefuls Told, FULTON COUNTY DAILY
REP., May 14, 2004, at 1.
304. Pollak, Declare Stands on Social Issues, supra note 299, at 1.
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Id.

309. George M. Weaver, Weaver: Critic Knocked Me But Not Facts on Sears, FULTON
COUNTY DAILY REP., July 6, 2004, at 5.

310. Michael A. Sullivan, Questionnaires Lead to Deception, Not Voter Knowledge,
FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP., June 24, 2004, at 5.

311. Jonathan Ringel, Sears vs. Brantley Race Not as Simple as Left and Right, FULTON
COUNTY DAILY REP., July 13, 2004, at 1.
312. Id.
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Both candidates adamantly disclaimed the activist judge label."'
However, Kathleen Womack, past president of the Stonewall Bar
Association, stated that Justice Sears "has become the face of the
'activist' judge" and was "targeted by religious conservatives."3 14
Justice Sears defended her refusal to answer the Christian Coalition
survey and called the questionnaire unethical." 5 Sears stated that all
United States Supreme Court decisions "are the law of the land, and a
judge has to follow the laws of the land."3 6 Furthermore,
317 Justice
Sears said, "it doesn't matter what you personally believe."
3. The Campaign Finance Loophole. While Georgia judicial
elections are ostensibly nonpartisan, the decisions in White and Weaver
loosened restrictions on party involvement. Grant Brantley was
"recruited by and openly played to Republicans," yet his campaign did
not "benefit from the state party's $1.5 million war chest. 3
The
Republicans cautiously decided not to fund any joint Weaver and other
Republican candidate advertisements. The Sears campaign raised
$396,000 and the Brantley campaign raised $227,000. 3 "9 However, the

Democratic Party of Georgia paid for more than $150,000 of Sears's
television commercials.3 2 ° Under state law, political parties may
donate only $5000 to a candidate's campaign.321 However, a loophole3 22 allows unlimited donations if the "expenditures [are] made by
a political party in support of a party ticket or a group of named candidates. 323 In the closing days of the campaign, the unopposed state
House members Billy Mitchell and Kathy Ashe ran a joint television
advertisement with Sears. The entire advertisement was devoted to
Sears.3 24 Only the last five seconds of the advertisement ran the
following words below the picture: "AUTHORIZED BY THE COMMITTEE TO RE-ELECT JUSTICE LEAH SEARS. PAID FOR BY THE

313. Christopher Seely, 'Activist'Judges Targeted: Gay-friendly Justice and Christian
Coalition CandidateBattle for State Supreme Court,SOUTHERN VOICE.cOM, June 11, 2004,
at http://www.sovo.com/2004/6-11/news/localnews/judge.cfm.
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Jonathan Ringel, Democrats Clever Ad Aided Sears Re-election, FULTON COUNTY
DAILY REP., July 22, 2004, at 1.
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. O.C.G.A. § 21-5-41(h) (2003).
322. Id.
323. Id. (emphasis added).
324. Ringel, Democrats Clever Ad Aided Sears Re-election, supra note 318, at 1.
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DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF GEORGIA. VOTE BILLY MITCHELL AND
KATHY ASHE, STATE REPRESENTATIVE."32 5
The Brantley campaign had no time to respond with anything other
than an email to its supporters which accused Sears of "l[ying] to the
people of Georgia because she ran as a political independent."3 26 In
her victory speech, Justice Sears declared that "[tihe courts of the state
remain untainted, free for independent judges who will make decisions
based on the law rather than on public opinion polls."327 Sears also
said "Democrats support an unbiased judiciary" and characterized her
Despite overt
campaign as "a coalition of wide-ranging groups."32
Republican signaling that Sears was ultra-liberal, Sears refused to give
any "winky-dinks" on issues that might come before the Georgia
Supreme Court.3 9 With last year's Democratic example, Republicans
will likely be eager to help fund future judicial races.
4. Proposed Legislative Responses. Following a highly partisan
judicial election cycle, Representative Mary Margaret Oliver, a Democrat, introduced House Bill 46 on January 11, 2005.30 The bill would
amend O.C.G.A. section 21-5-41(h) to read:
The limitations provided for in this Code section shall not include
contributions or expenditures made by a political party in support of
a party ticket or a group of named candidates except that said
limitations shall apply to expenditures in support of a group of named
candidates if one or more of those3 1candidates are candidates in a
nonpartisanrace for judicialoffice.

Representative Oliver hopes to keep judicial races nonpartisan by closing
the very campaign loophole that Justice Sears used to fund her last332
minute television campaign. The bill could hamstring both parties.
Nonpartisan judicial elections will remain nonpartisan only if "political
parties [do] not have [the] unlimited ability to donate." 33

3

Court

Futures Committee chairman and Henry County State Judge Benjamin
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Ed Bean, From Chicken Snatching to Body Snatching, FULTON COUNTY DAILY
REP., Dec. 27, 2004, at 2.
330. H.B. 46, 148th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2005), available at http://www.legis.
state.ga.us/legis/2005_06/fulltext/hb46.htm.
331. Id.
332. Greg Bluestein, State Bar May Back Campaign Reform Bill, FULTON COUNTY
DAILY REP., Dec. 13, 2004, at 1.
333. Id.
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W. Studdard III stated, the "unquestionable rise of party politics
prompted the Court Futures Committee to recommend the bill."334
Studdard recognized "more partisan input than we've seen since judicial
races became nonpartisan in Georgia."" ' Nevertheless, Oliver's bill
would not prevent political parties from funding independent issue
advocacy.336 Republican Senator and President Pro Tempore Eric
Johnson
has denied any plans for a return to partisan judicial elec3 37
tions.
In an acknowledged long shot, Representative Oliver introduced House
Bill 102 on January 25, 2005.338 The bill would give statewide judicial
candidates a chance "to accept public funding equal to fifty times their
qualifying fees."339 Georgia appellate judicial candidates could accept
around $230,000. 34 0 Local judicial candidates would not be eligible for
public funding. 341 In addition the bill would allow each statewide
judicial candidate to raise $50,000.42 Of the allowed $50,000 fundraising, a candidate could self-fund up to $10,000.3 43 To qualify for public
funding, judicial candidates would have to raise $25 contributions from
each of 100 registered voters.3 " Representative Oliver modeled the
bill on a North Carolina law.3 45 Oliver plans to fund the bill with
voluntary $10 taxpayer contributions from state income tax refunds,
from the State Election Board or State
donations and appropriations
3 46
Ethics Commission.
Bill Bozarth, executive director of Common Cause, supported publicly
funded judicial elections. 347 House Minority Leader S. Dubose Porter
emphasized "[the reason we made these races nonpartisan is to not
politicize them."3 4' R. William Ide, GCEJC chairman, considers the
bill a good compromise between judicial appointment and judicial

334. Id.
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. H.B. 102, 148th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2005), available at http://www.legis.
state.ga.us/legis/2005_06/fulltext/hbl02.htm.
339. Greg Bluestein, Yard Signs, Fliersand PublicMoney, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP.,
Jan. 24, 2005, at 1.
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. Id.
344. Id.
345. Id.
346. Id.
347. Id.
348. Id.
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election. 34 9 This bill would alert the public to the differences in
judicial and political elections.35 ° Public funding of judicial elections
would reinforce the non-representative nature of the judicial branch.35'
Critics of House Bill 102 include Grant Brantley, the Georgia Supreme
Court candidate who lost to Justice Leah Sears.352 Brantley warned
that public funding of judicial campaigns would further "insulate the
incumbent."35 3 Brantley saw low voter turnout as the main problem
affecting judicial elections and favored moving judicial elections from
primary election day to general election day. Other critics noted that
the public funding level is not high enough to keep candidates in
competitive statewide races from opting out of public funding. 4 Like
House Bill 46, House Bill 102 does not prevent judicial candidates from
on the independent expenditures of special interest
capitalizing
35 5
groups.

5. The GCEJC Report. On December 16, 2004, the private Georgia
Committee for Ethical Judicial Campaigns reported that "Democratic
and Republican party involvement in [the 2004] Georgia judicial
campaigns... threatened the state constitution's mandate for nonpartisan judicial elections." 5 ' The GCEJC is a private volunteer sixty-six
member group. Thus, the GCEJC is not a state actor. Two thirds of the
GCEJC membership are lawyers. 35 7 A GCEJC purpose is to restore
the constitutionally banished JQC mantle by exercising the "power of
moral suasion and the power to use its own First Amendment rights to
comment on the conduct that the [GCEJC] felt to be inappropriate."3 58
The GCEJC can act upon its own motion, but the GCEJC prefers to act
after complaints have been filed with the Committee.35 9
The GCEJC report criticized the $150,000 of television advertisements
the state Democratic party bought for Justice Sears.36 The report
stated "the expenditure violated the spirit of the state law that limits

349.
350.
351.
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.
COUNTY
357.
358.
359.
360.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Jonathan Ringel, Nonpartisan Voting Put in Jeopardy, Panel Reports, FULTON
DAILY REP., Dec. 20, 2004, at 1.
Symposium, supra note 16, at 841.
Id.
Id.
Ringel, Nonpartisan Voting Put in Jeopardy, supra note 356, at 1.
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campaign contributions to $5000 from any one entity."36' Republican
activist James H. Burnham filed a complaint against Sears's campaign
with the State Ethics Commission. Representative Oliver has filed a bill
that would close the loophole in O.C.G.A. section 21-5-41(h), which Sears
and the Democrats argue allows party funding of multiple candidate
commercials.3 62
The report also censured the state Republican party for its in-kind
support of Grant Brantley. However, the report did not detail any
evidence of in-kind contributions. Marty Klein, the state GOP communications director, stated that Brantley did not receive any in-kind
contributions. 36 3
Besides, any in-kind contributions "would have
required disclosure."3
Klein noted that any work he may have done
for Brantley "was before there was a campaign" and was worth far less
than the $150,000 of Democratic advertising. 65 Additionally, the
report suggested that Georgia should study publicly funded judicial campaigns.
The GCEJC recommended that the Georgia Supreme Court
should evaluate judicial
candidates's qualifications and make those
evaluations public."6 7
6. The State Bar's Proposed Changes to Canon 7. In a January
15, 2005 State Bar of Georgia Board of Governors meeting, the Board
approved a proposed judicial campaign ethics reform.368 State Bar
General Counsel William P. Smith III presented a report urging the JQC
to "ban judges and judicial candidates from accepting contributions from
political parties or identifying themselves as a candidate of a political
organization." 369 Judicial candidates have been allowed to state their
political affiliation in campaign literature since 1986. The proposed
changes to Canon 7 of the Code of Judicial Conduct would complement
House Bill 46.37" Together, the two changes "will solve our problem"
of politicized judicial races. 1

361. Id. (emphasis added).
362. Id.
363. Id.
364. Id.
365. Id.
366. Id.
367. Id.
368. 2005 Midyear State Bar of Georgia Board of Governors Meeting Summary, at
http://www.gabar.org/pdf/BOG/January-05_BOGMinutesRecap.pdf.
369. Greg Bluestein, Justice Kennedy to Speak at Bar Ceremony, FULTON COUNTY
DAILY REP., Jan. 14, 2005, at 1.
370. Id.
371. Id.
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Debra H. Bernes Won the Open Georgia Court of Appeals Seat

Three Different Elections for One Seat. Originally six
1.
candidates vied for the Georgia Court of Appeals seat left vacant by
departing Judge Frank Eldridge. In the first of three elections, Bernes
earned the highest vote tally in the July 20, 2004 election.372 After a
statewide recount determined that Mike Sheffield would advance to a
Debra Bernes, Howard N. Mead III, the third place finisher,
runoff with
37 3
filed suit.
In Mead v. Sheffield," 4 Mead alleged that "the number of illegal
absentee ballots cast in Laurens County was sufficient to render the
outcome of the election in doubt."375 Four hundred eighty-one absentee
ballots listed an incorrect name for Mead. 37' The court noted that
O.C.G.A. section 21-2-284(c) provides that the names of all qualified
candidates "shall be printed on the ballots."3 77 The court determined
that the number of "irregularly prepared absentee ballots [that] were
returned in Laurens County" exceeded Sheffield's margin of victory over
Mead and that the "dispositive factor [was] the illegality of the total
number of [returned] absentee ballots." 8 The court remanded to the
trial court with directions for the trial court to order a new statewide
election.3 79
The three lowest vote-getters, Lee Tarte Wallace, W. Ashley Hawkins,
and Thomas C. Rawlings, dropped out of the race. In the second election
on November 2, 2004, Bernes again garnered the most votes. Bernes
In
and Mead advanced to the November 23, 2004 runoff election.
the third and last election, Bernes finally won outright with 54.1 percent
of the vote.3 8'

372. Incumbents Stay; Money Flows in Appellate Races, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP.,
Dec. 27, 2004, at 32.
373. Mead v. Sheffield, 278 Ga. 268, 268, 601 S.E.2d 99, 100 (2004).
374. Id.
375. Id.
376. Id.
377. Id. at 269, 601 S.E.2d at 100.
378. Id. at 270, 601 S.E.2d at 101.
379. Id. at 273-74, 601 S.E.2d at 103.
380. Incumbents Stay; Money Flows in Appellate Races, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP.,
Dec. 27, 2004, at 32.
381. Jonathan Ringel, Bernes Trumps Big-Spending Rival, CarriesMetro Area: Mead's
$3 Million Not Enough to Win Appeals Seat, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP., Nov. 29, 2004,
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2. The Most Expensive Judicial Race in State History. Even
more than the convoluted series of elections, the campaign for the
Georgia Court of Appeals seat "will be remembered for its largess:
Bernes spent $600,000 on the race, and Mead lent his campaign about
$3 million." 38 2 The campaign was easily the most expensive judicial
race in state history. University of Georgia political science associate
professor Jeffrey L. Yates asserted that "[g]rassroots may [have been]
the key [to Bernes's victory]."38 3
Another University of Georgia
political science professor, Charles S. Bullock III, deduced that many
people "were offended by the vast sums of money that Mead spent."3"
In a letter to the editor of the Fulton County Daily Report, Mead was
christened the "poster child for judicial campaign finance reform"
because of his unprecedented and "over the top" campaign spending.8 5
The letter writer insisted that public perception of judicial integrity will
be tainted
if "even one judge can get to the bench because of the color of
3 86
money."

3. "Misleading" Advertisements. Mead provoked the ire of the
criminal defense bar after his self-funded $1 million television advertising campaign calumnized Bernes and Sheffield "for quitting their jobs
as prosecutors and 'working to keep drunk drivers, drug dealers and
child molesters out of jail.' ' 387 Another ad called Bernes and Sheffield
"high-priced criminal defense lawyers [who] work for the kind of people
they once sent to jail."38 8 Criminal defense lawyers retorted that
Mead's ads "suggested [he] didn't understand criminal defendants' right
to counsel."389 Mead insisted his commercials were merely comparisons between his career choices and the career choices of Bernes and
Sheffield.39 °

382. Incumbents Stay; Money Flows in Appellate Races, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP.,
Dec. 27, 2004, at 32. See also Bill Rankin, Big Bucks Buy Blitz in Judge's Race, THE
ATLANTA J.-CONST., Oct. 22, 2004, at Al.
383. Ringel, Bernes Trumps Big-Spending Rival, supra note 381, at 1.
384. Id.
385. J. Robert Persons, Mead Called 'Poster Child' for Judicial Campaign Reform,
FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP., Nov. 8, 2004, at 2.
386. Id.
387. Jonathan Ringel, COA Choices Make Closing Arguments, FULTON COUNTY DAILY
REP., Nov. 17, 2004, at 1.
388. Ringel, Bernes Trumps Big-Spending Rival, supra note 381, at 1.
389. Ringel, COA Choices Make ClosingArguments, supra note 387, at 1.
390. Id.

2005]

JUDICIAL SELECTION SYSTEM

1075

The GCEJC reprimanded Mead and called his advertisements
"misleading and inaccurate." 91 Mead countered that the GCEJC
lacked the credibility to challenge him because of conflicts of interest
within the Committee.39 2 Carol Brantley, a GCEJC member, worked
as Lee Tarte Wallace's campaign manager before Wallace dropped out
of the Court of Appeals race.393 Brantley and R. William Ide III, the
GCEJC chairman, maintain that Brantley was not involved with the
GCEJC's decision to reprimand Mead's commercials. Moreover, the
executive committee responsible for the rebuke included Cary Ichter,
who appeared to have donated money to Sheffield. However, a copy of
the donation check demonstrated that Ichter's wife made the donation
to Sheffield's campaign from the couple's joint checking account. 39 '
The GCEJC was formed to ensure that the JQC's old public monitoring role of judicial campaign speech would not be completely lost after
the decision in Weaver. The GCEJC has no government power to punish
candidates, so the "credibility of its public reprimands" depends on the
public's perception of the GCEJC's neutrality. 95 The GCEJC is trying
to organize a broad membership base without generating perceived
conflicts of interests.396
4. The Pledge vs. The Survey. Like the supreme court race, the
GCEJC called for the candidates in the court of appeals race to pledge
to voluntarily follow the old judicial campaign ethics rules. The GCEJC
secured signed pledges from three candidates and oral commitments
from the other four candidates. 9 ' Likewise, the Christian Coalition
requested the court of appeals candidates to fill out the five issue survey.
Of the six candidates, only Michael Sheffield completed the Christian
Coalition survey.398 The other candidates stated that responding to
the survey questions "could jeopardize his or her impartiality from the
bench."39' 9 Presiding Judge G. Alan Blackburn, who was uncontested
in his re-election campaign for the Georgia Court of Appeals, called for
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Realizing Need for FormalRules, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP., Nov. 12, 2004, at 1.
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DAILY REP., June 1, 2004, at 1.
399. Id.
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a "happy medium."4"0 Blackburn found his happy medium by stating
that while he was pro-life, his opinion did not "give [him] the authority
to overrule Roe v. Wade."40 1
V.

CONCLUSION

"The people want good Judges, and will adopt any method that will
get good judges."4 °2
In future statewide judicial elections, the judicial candidates will likely
continue to follow the old campaign ethics rules. Assuming the
campaign finance loophole is closed, the state parties will not heavily
However, Georgia may still
fund judicial candidate campaigns.
experience judicial campaign advertisements funded by independent
issue organizations. The 2004 election results demonstrate that the
voting public prefers a nonpartisan judicial campaign to a highly
politicized one. While a constitutional amendment rejuvenating the JNC
may not be visible on the political horizon, the public financing of
statewide judicial campaigns may be more politically viable.
No judicial selection mechanism is perfect. Yet the question remains:
Have Georgia's responses to White and Weaver been sufficient to bury
politicized judicial selection in more than just a shallow grave? The
changes to the judicial canon, the increased private speech of the GCEJC
campaign, the GCEJC pledge, the proposed legislation, and the proposed
Georgia State Bar reforms have all been adequate. However, the threat
of politicized judicial elections still looms large. One solution to this
problem would be to reinvigorate the JNC. Currently, the JNC is
created by executive order, so it has no authority apart from the
governor from whence it sprang. Georgia governors are not required to
pick from the slate of candidates that the JNC proffers. Individual JNC
members do not serve fixed terms; instead, they serve at the governor's
pleasure. The JNC need not be a bipartisan or nonpartisan body.
A stronger and more independent JNC would relieve a small part of
the dual pressure on the judiciary to be impartial and to appear
impartial. A constitutional amendment would give the JNC a measure
of its own authority, separate and apart from the governor. The
governor would be forced to pick from the JNC slate, the JNC membership would be less partisan, and the JNC members would serve definite
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402.
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and fixed terms. Still, few governors 4 3 are likely to voluntarily give
up part of their appointment powers.
Nevertheless, Georgia should not pin all her hopes for truly nonpartisan judicial elections on changes to the JNC. Even a strong JNC can be
stymied. The JNC selection process cannot control every flaw in the
judicial system. Ultimately, a front-loaded screening process has very
little effect on professional accountability. While the majority of
candidates selected by the JNC are highly qualified, the JNC cannot
If
filter out every unqualified or undesirable judicial candidate.
"anybody could clean up their act and seem rational and reasonable for
fifteen minutes at a cocktail party[,]" 40 4 why would a fifteen minute
interview before the JNC be any different?
CAMILLE M. TRIBBLE

403. In fact, the 2001 Florida Legislature increased the governor's control over the
selection of appellate judges and the appointment of state court judges. Drew Noble Lanier
& Roger Handberg, In the Eye of the Hurricane:FloridaCourts, JudicialIndependence, and
Politics, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1029, 1049-50 (2002).
404. Symposium, supra note 16, at 878-79.

